

(240)

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(240)

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69
(Descriptive Statistics)

148

89
.977

(One-Way ANOVA)

(240)
(240)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(240)

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2006/5/3

.2007/2/18

(1999) (ISA 240, p. 222) (240)
(International Standard on Auditing ISA No. 240)

(ISA 240, p.222)
(240)

" (240)

(1999) :
1997
"Errors AICPA
and Irregularities"
(Marncian and Jone, 1997) "Fraud"

(Krishnan, 1997)
(240)

(2003) :
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.2

19 2003 2000

26 (2003 2002) :
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	:	.2	
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	-)	
	-		.(1998
		:	(ISA 240 Appendix 1 p.34)
		:	-1
			-

(ISA 240, Items No.13, 14, and 15, 2004, p.7)
(59-58 2000)

(Attitudes/ / (3
:Rationalization)

(Arens et al., 2005; pp.

311-313)

(AICPA)

(SAS 99)
2002/12/15

.(Bossard and Blum, 2004)

(Arens

et al., 2005)

: (Fraud Triangle)
(1
(Incentives/Pressures)

:

.3

(1991)

:(Opportunities)

(2

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(%13) : -1
(1999)
The Theory of Signal Detection -2

(Lee, 1995)

(Lee, 1995)

(100 - 50)

(2004)

(1999) .(143)

%12

(Moyes and Hasan, 1996)

375

(CPA)

218

(Deshmukh et al., 1998)

(Ernst and Young

28

International Fraud Group, 1998)

1998

1993

25

(15)

(Keith, 1999)

(Logistic

Regression)

(AICPA)

(IMA)

(Douglas and Zimbelman, 2003)

(Raymond,

1999)

SAS 99

615

421

"82

"

"

"

(Johnson et al., 2001)

82

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"

T-Test

.82

(82)

82

82

%66

(82)

(Owusu-Anash et al.,

-

(56)

2002)

(Strategic Reasoning)

(ASPEN Publishers, Miller

GAAS Update Service 2003)

(SAS 99)

(Ian and Kenny, 2004)

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-1

-2

(Brainstorming)

15

-3

:

-1

-2

-3

-4

(Graham and Bedard,

2003)

(Kaminski et al., 2004)

79

79

(Big 5 Companies)

17

1999

1982

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.4

:

:

H0

(Bossard and Blum, 2004)

SAS 99

:

H1

(The

:

H02

Association of Fraud Examiners)

2002

600

.6 ()

(1) ()
(1)

() (%2.9) (%81.2) 2003
(%15.9)

() (32)
(1) 148

(%97.1) (89) %60
(%1.4)

(69) (89)
. %77

(1)

(JCPA)

CPA (%44.9)
(JCPA) Statistical Package for Social
(%29) Sciences (SPSS)

(%13) CPA

) (5) :
22 31) (3) (4
() (1) (2)

(1)

5-1
(%66.7) (%80-61) (%60-41) (%40-21) (%20-0)
(%33.3) (%100-81)

Ernst "One-Way ANOVA"

(%23.2) and Young

(%17.4) "Deloitte Touch"

(%1.02) "KPMG"

"Price WaterHouse"

(1)

...

.(%10.1)

(1)

%2.9	2	
%81.2	56	
%15.9	11	
%97.1	67	
%1.4	1	
%1.4	1	
%44.9	31	
%13	9	CPA
%8.7	6	CA
%29	22	CPA + CPA
%66.67	46	
%33.33	25	
%17.4	12	Deloitte Touch
%23.2	16	Ernst Young
%15.9	11	KPMG
% 10.1	7	Price Coopers
%52.2	36	5
%26.1	18	10 5
%10.1	7	15 10
%4.3	3	20 15
%7.2	5	20

.(%4.3) (20-15)

-5)

5
 (%52.2)
 (%26.1) (10
 (%10.1) (15-10)
 (%7.2) 20

(2)

1.26	3.06	10.1	27.5	37.7	13	5.8		1
1.13	3.55	20.3	39.1	21.7	13	5.8)	2
1.21	3.20	14.5	30.4	26.1	18.8	10.1	(3
1.09	3.68	21.7	43.5	21.7	8.7	2.9		4
1.17	3.92	34.8	43.5	8.7	7.2	4.3		5
								6
1.27	3.50	23.2	36.2	17.4	18.6	0	:	
1.03	3.43	15.9	30.4	39.1	11.6	1.4		
1.02	3.68	20.3	44.9	20.3	11.6	2.9		
1.16	3.62	20.3	44.9	20.3	8.7	2.9		
1.19	3.23	13	29	37.7	13	2.9		7
1.14	3.14	7.2	34.8	37.7	11.6	2.9		8
1.23	3.55	21.7	40.6	17.4	14.5	2.9		9
1.22	3.75	29	40.6	15.9	8.7	2.9		10
1.20	3.65	26.1	36.2	23.2	7.2	5.8		11

(3)

F	F			
0.214	1.578			
		0.457	2.97	
		0.595	3.77	
		0.715	3.44	
0.629	0.467			
		0.599	3.67	
		0	3.58	
		0	4.25	
		0.733	3.43	
		0.585	3.56	
		1.20	4.029	
		0.497	4.029	
0.051	3.958			
		0.714	3.35	
		0.632	3.69	
*0.003	3.86			
		0.682	3.33	Deloitte touch
		0.666	4.10	Ernst Young
		0.598	3.44	KPMG
		0.155	4.23	Price Water House Coopers
0.772	0.260			
		0.683	3.48	3 1
		0.665	3.39	7 4
		0.794	3.56	15 12
0.986	0.087			
		0.739	3.51	5
		0.586	3.41	10 5
		0.751	3.41	10 15
		0.718	3.54	20 15
		0.974	3.54	20

.005

(4)

0.97	4.02	31.9	49.3	13	2.9	1.4	12	
1.08	3.58	18.8	40.6	24.6	13	1.4	13	
							14	
1.24	3.77	29	44.9	8.7	11.6	2.9		
1.13	3.40	15.9	37.7	23.2	17.4	5.8		
1.08	3.64	20.3	43.5	20.3	13	1.4		
1.08	3.87	30.4	43.5	13	8.7	4.3		

(5)

(3.92)

"

"

(%43.5)

:

H0

(%8.7)

(%34.8)

:

H1

(%4.3) (%7.2)

(2)

(3) (3.92) (%87)
(1.17)

(240)

:
: **H02** () (193)
() (7) (1997) (22)
: **H2** (73)
(2003)

(3)

(2)
(3) (3.2)

(3)
($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(0.05) (0.003)
(Tukey)

Ernst (%14.5)
Deloitte Touch and Young (%30.4) (%26.1)
(4.10) Ernst and Young (%18.8)
(0.044) (%10.1)
(3)

(Ernst and Young, 1998)
(2)

(5)

F	F			
0.037*	3.480			
		0.117	2.416	
		0.826	3.803	
		0.692	3.744	
0.703	0.354			
		0.720	3.706	
		0.000	3.666	
		0.000	3.715	
0.462	0.913			
		0.797	3.645	
		0.428	3.814	
		0.707	4.166	
		0.333	4.166	
0.376	0.798			
		0.7282	3.655	
		0.7499	3.820	
*0.020	2.758			
		0.797	3.452	Deloitte touch
		0.494	3.666	Grand touch
		0.460	4.208	Ernst Young
		0.665	3.928	KPMG
		0.654	3.350	
		1.060	3.583	
		0.2546	2.888	
		0.166	4.333	Price Water House Coopers
0.963	0.037			
		0.717	3.688	3 1
		0.815	3.741	7 4
		0.712	3.731	15 12
0.954	0.167			
		0.784	3.717	5
		0.651	3.713	10 5
		0.718	3.547	15 10
		0.822	3.777	20 15
		0.734	3.900	20

.05

*

(Ernst

and young)

"	(13)	(3.58)		
"				
	-	(%18.8)	:	H03
		-(4)		
			:	H3
(%24.6)	(%40.6)			
(%1.4)	(%13)		(4)	
14)		((%31.9) (4)	
			(12)	
	(3.87)		(%49.3)	
(4)			(%13)	
			(%1.4) (%2.9)	
		(3)		
			(4)	
(240)				
" :				
			- (% 80.4)	
"		- (0.97)		(4.02)
		:		
:		H04		
				(Douglas and Zimbelman, 2003)
:		H4		SAS 99
				(4)

(6)

1.19	3.72	27.5	40.6	17.4	5.8	8.7		15
1.01	3.96	31.9	46.4	8.7	11.6	1.4		16
1.37	2.91	18.8	14.5	23.2	26.7	17.4		17
1.31	3.23	15.9	34.8	21.7	11.6	15.9		18
95.	3.97	31.9	42	20.3	2.9	2.9		19
1.11	4.50	53.6	26.1	13	1.4	5.8		20
1.04	4.02	40.6	34.8	13	10.1	1.4		21
92.	3.82	23.2	46.4	21.7	7.2	1.4		22
1.05	4.04	42	31.9	17.4	5.8	2.9)	23
1.14	3.58	20.3	40.6	24.6	5.8	8.7	.(24
1.09	3.43	13	42	29	7.2	8.7)	25
1.01	4.33	60.9	20.3	13	2.9	2.9	.(26

(7)

F	F			
0.607	0.503			
		0.471	3.416	
		0.494	3.818	
		0.6180	3.665	
0.629	0.467			
		0.599	3.675	
		0.000	3.583	
		0.000	4.250	
0.175	1.640			
		0.648	3.685	
		0.5111	3.759	
		0.235	3.416	
		0.323	4.208	
		0.549	3.710	
*0.043	4.238			
		0.570	3.573	
		0.598	3.873	
0.074	2.046			
		0.426	3.695	Deloitte Touch
		0.404	3.927	Ernst Young
		0.478	3.702	KPMG
		4.811	4.138	Price Water House Coopers
0.471	0.761			
		0.6381	3.776	3 1
		0.608	3.575	7 4
		0.500	3.638	15 12
0.556	0.758			
		0.577	3.574	5
		0.467	3.865	1 5
		0.580	3.726	10 15
		0.509	3.805	20 15
		1.119	3.666	20

.05 *
.10 **

"				(5)	
.					
:				(5)	
:		H05		($\alpha \leq 0.05$)	
.					
:		H5		(0.020)	(0.037)
.				Tukey	(0.05)
.					
	(6)				
				(3.7)	
					(.0.035)
	(6)			(3.8)	
	(26)	(4.23)			(0.031)
	(%60.9)	(6)			
					(240)
(%13)		(%20.3)			
	(%2.9)				
				(Tukey)	
-(% 86.6)					
- (1.01)		(4.33)			
.					
					($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
"	(6)				
	(17)	(2.9)			
"					
(%18.8)				(H4)	"

(%14.5)
(%23.2)
(%17.4) (%26.7)

.7

-1

H06

(240)

-2

H6

(7)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

Ernst and Young

(7)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(0.05)

(0.043)

(Tukey)

-3

(240)

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

" :

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.(240)

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(240)

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-6

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

.(240)

- 38)
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2000

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.47

1991

1999

.36 1

.153 - 130

1986

1999

.57 - 50

.38

1998

2003 (73)

.55 - 35

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Compliance with International Auditing Standard No. 240 Concerning Auditors' Responsibility for Detecting and Preventing Fraud

*Munther T. Al-Momany and Jamal I. Bdour**

ABSTRACT

This study aims at investigating the extent to which Jordanian Certified Public Accountants (JCPAs) observe International Auditing Standard No. 240 (ISA 240) concerning their responsibility for detecting and preventing fraud. The researchers designed a three-part questionnaire covering the three aspects of ISA 240 and the measures taken by the auditor to detect fraud. The researchers then selected a sample of 89 of the 148 JCPAs working in audit firms in Amman, the capital of Jordan. Sixty nine questionnaires were retrieved with a (77%) response rate.

The findings of the study revealed that the respondents take the necessary measures to detect and prevent fraud in compliance with the procedures as stated in the ISA no. 240 when fraud is detected. Furthermore, the respondents follow the appropriate measures to report fraud to management, stakeholders and regulatory and executive bodies according to the procedures stated in the ISA no. 240.

The findings revealed statistically significant differences (at $\alpha = 0.05$) in the respondents' perceptions of their measures to detect and prevent fraud which can be attributed to sample demographic variables and affiliation (or lack thereof) with international auditing firms are applying those procedures more than those who do not have any association. The findings further revealed significant differences (at $\alpha = 0.05$) in the respondents' views regarding the measures taken when fraud is detected, which can be attributed to academic qualifications and affiliation with international firms, in favor of Bachelor and Master's degree (vs. diploma) holders. Furthermore, no statistically significant differences (at $\alpha = 0.05$) were detected between Bachelor and Master's degree holders. Tukey's post-hoc comparisons revealed no statistically significant differences which can be attributed to affiliation with one international auditing firm than another. Finally, the findings revealed statistically significant differences (at $\alpha = 0.05$) in the measures taken to report fraud to management, stakeholders, and regulatory and executive bodies, which can be attributed to the international firm with which the auditor or his/her firm is affiliated although post-hoc comparisons did not show any statistically significant differences in favor of any international auditing firm. Based on these findings, relevant recommendations were put forth.

Keywords: Detecting fraud, Jordanian Certified Public Accountants, ISA240.

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