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New York Stock and Exchange Commission (SEC)
(Knapp, 1987) Exchange (NYSE)

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(Treadway, 1987) (AICPA, 1978)

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(Wolf, 1994) (

⁽¹⁾ Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2002

(Whittington and Pany, 2003)

Cadbury Committee (1992)

(Securities

(Higson, 2003)

2006/11/30

2005/3/13

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: (Corporate Governance)

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(Stakeholders)

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1998

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1998

.(Collier, 1997)

(Turley and Zaman, 2004)

Blue Ribbon Committee (1999)

Cadbury Committee

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.(Tackett, 2004)

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.(Rezaee et. al., 2003)

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(Morse and Keegan, 1999)

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	(Collier, 1997)	(Moxey, 2004) ((Abdel-Khalik, 2002)	
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		1997			
					(Higson, 2003)
				.(Smith, 1776)	
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			-3	(Tricker, 1984)	
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	.(1287	4274	"	(Parkinson, 1994)	"
			(Tricker, 1984)	"	"
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	2004		"	(Solomon and Solomon, 2004)	
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(Mautz and Neumann,

and Snook, 1979)

1977)

(DeZoort, 1997)

(Pincus et. al., 1989)

NASDAQ

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(Teoh and Lim, 1996)

(Bradbury, 1990)

(Agency Theory)

(Beattie et. al., 1999)

(Green, 1994)

(Goodwin and Seow, 2002)

(Code of Conduct)

(McMullen, 1996)

(DeZoort and Salterio, 2001)

(DeFond and Jiambalvo,

1991)

(Beasley et. al., 2000)

(Scarborough et. al., 1998)

(Turley and Zaman, 2003) (Menon 200 and Williams, 1994)
(Case Study)

(1998) (Cohen et. al., 2002)

(Al-Twaijry et. al., 2002) :

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(Joshi

and Wakil, 2004)

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(Big Four)

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(Hussain and Mallin,

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 %20 30 25 %39
 40 31 " " (Jargon)
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(%83) -2
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%73 .(/)

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(1)

%96	72	
%4	3	
%100	75	
%26.7	20	25
%38.7	29	30 25
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%8	6	50 41
%6.6	5	50
%100	75	
%52	39	5
%25.3	19	10 5
%10.7	8	15 11
%4	3	20 16
%8	6	20
%100	75	
%4	3	
%0	0	
%82.7	62	
%4	3	
%0	7	
%9.3	0	
%100	75	
%24	18	
%76	57	
%100	75	
%58.7	44	
%41.3	31	
%100	75	
%62.7	47	
%37.3	28	

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%100	75	
%72.6	53	
%27.4	20	
%100	73	(2)

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(Interim Financial

Statements)

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(2)

P- Value				
0	1.44	5.63		1
0	1.14	6.08		2
0	1.04	6.10		3
0	1.19	5.79)	4
0	1.16	5.49	()	5
0	1.01	5.77		6

(3)) ((Creative Accounting)

(Whittington, 1993; Collier, .(Short-Termism)
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(4) P-Value (" "

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P-Value				
0.001	1.82	4.75		7
0.447	1.99	3.82		8
0.381	2.01	3.79		9
0.021	1.94	4.53		10
0	1.28	5.44		11
0	1.56	5.67		12
0	1.46	5.08		13
0	1.30	5.15		14
0.001	1.92	4.74		15
0.008	1.82	4.57		16

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0.05 P-Value
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P-Value				
0.727	2.30	3.91		17
0	1.78	2.68		18
0.097	2.10	3.58		19
0.007	2.13	4.69		20
0	1.52	5.88		21

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P-Value

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Kruskal-Wallis

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P-Value	40	40-31	30-25	25		
0.038	6.45	6.64	6.04	5.55		2
0.019	5.91	6.13	5.10	5.35)	5
0.042	2.60	3.13	4.36	4.20	(8

						:
P-Value	15	15-11	10-5	5		
0.016	2.75	2.13	4.05	4.29		8
						:
P-Value						
0.021	6.30	5.52				1
0.029	6.60	6.00				2
0.050	6.40	5.67)	(4
0.010	6.30	5.71				6
						:
P-Value						
0.002	5.35	6.50				1
0.032	5.93	6.56				2
0.022	5.32	6.06	()		5
						:
P-Value						
0.014	4.75	5.39				14
0.016	3.79	5.04				16
						:
P-Value						
0.036	4.68	3.48				9
0.041	5.33	4.26				10
0.039	6.25	5.40				12
0.035	2.74	3.94				19
0.003	5.84	4.23				20

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.(Tackett, 2004)

(Abdullatif, 2003)

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(World Com Enron)

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Audit Committees' Responsibilities and Their Relevance to the Corporate Governance Process: Perceptions from Jordanian Auditors

*Modar A. Abdullatif**

ABSTRACT

This research aimed at studying the degree of relevance and suitability of audit committees' responsibilities, as they are stated in the Jordanian regulations, for fulfilling the audit committees' role in the corporate governance process. In addition, the research covers the degree of relevance and suitability of other suggested new responsibilities of audit committees in achieving the same goal, and it also covers the characteristics that should be possessed by an audit committee member. In order to achieve that, the study used a questionnaire which, was distributed to auditors who work at Jordanian audit firms, which audit Jordanian companies that are legally required to establish an audit committee.

Results of this study show that auditors consider the responsibilities of audit committees, as stated in Jordanian regulations, to be suitable for fulfilling the committees' role in corporate governance. Auditors also suggested additional responsibilities of audit committees to be added to the currently required ones, especially in areas expected to facilitate the audit process and improve corporate governance. However, auditors rejected any suggested role for audit committees in decisions of hiring or dismissing auditors or determining audit fees, despite the expected benefits of such a role. Auditors also preferred that members of audit committees to be persons who have ample financial knowledge and are independent from the company, not being members of its board of directors or senior executive management.

Keywords: Audit Committees, Corporate Governance, External Auditors, Auditing.

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